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Abstract
This paper engages in a critique of the problem of 
time and a presentist approach to the problem. The 
metaphysical problem of time bothers on the question of 
whether time exists the same way some other existents 
in the universe are said to exist. There have been 
arguments for and against the position of the reality of 
time. One of the metaphysical positions on the reality of 
time is presentism. Presentism is the view that only the 
present constitutes the reality of time. Past and future 
are unreal and do not constitute time. Thus, the position 
of presentism, unlike other positions on the reality of 
time, posits real existence of times to be that which is 
present. This paper seeks to argue that presentism is 
self-stultifying and faces a dilemma that shows that the 
theory either posits the unreality of time (which will be 
opposing to what it purportedly stands for) or it admits 
of other features of time (that is, past and future). Either 
way, presentism is faced with a challenge that it is an 
inadequate theory of addressing the problem of time.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of time is one of the problems that 
philosophers, since ancient Greek, have been concerned 
with. The question that bothers philosophers about time 
is on the reality of time. Philosophers such as Aristotle, 
Plotinus and J. M. E. McTaggart have argued and taken 
positions on the reality of time. In most recent literature 
on the problem of time, J. M. E. McTaggart’s paper, on 
the unreality of time, is arguably, most referenced and 
it presents the take-off point for most contemporary 
arguments on the problem of time (McTaggart, 1908). 
Although, McTaggart’s submission is that time is not real, 
subsequent positions (held by other philosophers) on the 
problem of time have taken off from his distinction of the 
order of time into A-series and B-series. For the A-series, 
McTaggart argues that time has the characteristics of past, 
present and future. Distinction of the order of time in this 
regard, according to him, is temporary and it accredits to 
time the phenomenon of change.
On the other hand are the B-series characteristics 
of time, that is, the ordering of time into the relational 
concepts of “earlier than” and “later than”. This he 
argues is permanent. The B-series which is relational and 
permanent in nature, McTaggart argues, cannot represent 
the nature of time. The A-series, for him, involves 
contradiction as there is an underlining implication that 
every moment must have the characteristics of the past, 
present and the future at the same time. Thus, McTaggart 
submits that time is not real.
This submission notwithstanding, contemporary 
philosophers’ discourse on the problem of time has 
majored on the distinction made by McTaggart. In Nathan 
Oaklander’s wonder, the contemporary discourse on the 
problem of time has been,
the debate between those who hold the tensed or A-theory 
of time, those who hold the tenseless or B-theory of time, 
and those who hold a hybrid A-B theory of time. The debate 
between these three theories concerns the question of whether 
the ultimate metaphysical nature of time is to be understood in 
terms of temporal becoming, temporal relations or both temporal 
becoming and temporal relations. (Oaklander, 1998) 
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 Among these positions cited by Oakland that have 
foundations in McTaggart’s distinction of the order of 
time into A-series and B-series is that of presentism. 
Presentism is the view that only the present constitute 
the reality of time. Past and future are unreal and do not 
constitute time. It is, however, imperative to state that 
presentism departs from the traditional distinction of the 
A-series ordering of time into past, present and future. Of 
these three characteristics of the A-series order of time, 
presentism acknowledges only one – that is, the present – 
as that which constitutes time. 
In this paper, I shall try to examine a formulation of 
the theory of presentism, its thesis, and challenges. I shall 
argue that the position of presentism (understood in the 
formulation examined) is faced with a dilemma which 
portrays a stultifying challenge to presentism and as such 
submit that presentism does not present an adequate 
theory for addressing the problem of time.
1. AN EXAMINATION OF PRESENTISM
Presentism, like most theories in philosophy, has assumed 
different formulations. This is so given the fact that 
advocates of the theory tend to adjust in addressing 
challenges against the theory. This, however, does not 
mean that there is no underlining thesis for the theory. 
Ned Markosian, for instance, defines presentism as 
…the view that only presents objects exist. According to 
Presentism, if we are to make an accurate list of all things that 
exist – i.e. a list of all the things that our most unrestricted 
quantifiers range over – there would be not a single non-present 
object on the list. (Markosian, 2004, p.47) 
From this definition, one may literally take presentism 
to mean that only “present” things exist in the strict 
sense of the word. But according to James van Cleve, 
“presentists are not holocaust deniers; their insistence 
that nothing past exists is compatible with their affirming 
truths about what happened using tense operators.” 
(Van Cleve, 2009, pp.80-81) From van Cleve’s position, 
one would see that the position of presentism is not to 
deny people or events that had happened at an earlier 
time, but that the presentist language only accords truth-
value to statements in tenseless forms. With regard to 
this definition as well, presentism is faced with some 
challenges. 
One of these is that presentism is often defined in 
terms of what it is not rather than what it is. This is 
evident in the definition that portrays the theory as holding 
past and future events as non-existents. On the other hand, 
the seemingly positive definition of presentism that tends 
to define it in terms of what it is rather than what it is not 
is faced with a further problem. This problem is termed 
the triviality problem. Jesse Mulder argues that 
defining the view – in terms of a suitable, tensed existence 
claim, that is – turn out to be either trivially true (so that 
they are acceptable to everyone, including eternalists) or 
trivially false (so that they are acceptable to nobody, including 
presentists). (Mulder, 2016) 
I will return to the triviality argument shortly, the focus 
here is to understand the formulations of presentism. Thus, 
in avoiding the challenges against a negative approach of 
defining presentism in terms of what it is not, a positive 
approach to its definition employs the tensed-tenseless 
method of expressing existents.
To make sense of the explanation above, illustration 
may be of help. The philosopher, Socrates, existed in 
the 5th century BC (in the past) and not in the present. 
The next Olympics games are yet to come and are in the 
future. Presentism does not outrightly deny the existence 
of Socrates (past) and the Olympic games (future), it has 
a way of expressing them to imply that they exist and not 
that one had existed and the other will exist. For instance, 
instead of saying: “Socrates was a Greek philosopher” or 
“The Olympic games will hold in 2036”, the presentist 
will express these statements as follow: “It has been that 
Socrates is a Greek philosopher” and “It will be that there 
is Olympics games in 2036”.1 From these examples, one 
can thus infer that the position of presentism that only 
present entities exist does not strictly exclude things we 
ordinarily take to be in the past or in the future but that 
these can be expressed to portray the idea of “presentness” 
in them.
2 .  T H E  C H A R G E  O F  T R I V I A L I T Y 
AGAINST PRESENTISM
Given the above explication of presentism, one may 
be tempted to reduce presentism to a mere linguistic 
approach of addressing issues. That is, that presentism 
is not a substantive theory in the problem of time but 
rather a way of using language to express the existence 
of entities in time. However, this does not seem to hold 
the substance. It is true that presentism has a language of 
expressing the existence of entities in time, it is concerned 
with a more tangible question in the problem of time and 
that is – if time is real (or exists) – of what nature will 
time be? The nature of time, I think, is a more substantive 
question that presentism is concerned but the presentist 
language is just a way of buttressing its position.
The objection from language points to another 
objection that has been levelled against presentism. This 
objection is called the triviality objection. The triviality 
charge against presentism goes thus: If it is granted, 
according to presentism, that only present things exist or 
that only things in the present exist, then presentism is 
either trivially true or trivially false. The claim that only 
1 This idea of the presentist’s form of expressing propositions in this 
manner	is	credited	to	David	Lewis	in	his	paper	“Tensed	Quantifier”	
in D. W. Zimmerman (Ed.). (2004). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1, 
6. 
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present things exist suggests that this existence is in the 
present. Put in other words, one can say “only present 
things exist now”. This interpretation will be a mere 
truism. This is so because it neither justifies anything 
nor gives a new piece of information about what exist 
and when they exist. Presentism, understood in this 
way, only restates an obvious truth. On the other hand, 
if presentism is interpreted to hold that “only present 
things existed, exist or will exist”, the tensed verb will 
indicate a contradiction. For example, to say that “The 
Wall of Jericho existed, exists or will exist” will be false 
and contradictory because the Wall of Jericho is not in the 
present. Also, if presentism is interpreted to hold that “only 
present things (tenselessly) exist”, then this would suggest 
an ambiguous sense of existence, for it cannot be said 
whether to quantify the existence in the past, present or 
future. This way too, presentism is considered false (Crisp, 
2004). Another implication of the triviality argument, 
according to Mulder, is that if interpreted in the first sense 
that suggests trivial truth, then it would be consistent 
with the position of the eternalists who hold an opposing 
view to that of the presentist – the view that every point 
in time is real. On the side of trivial falsehood, Mulder 
claims that the second interpretation of presentism tends 
to be unacceptable even to presentist themselves (Mulder, 
2016).
Thomas Crisp, however, argues that the triviality 
argument is unsound and false. For Crisp, 
Suppose that eternalism is true. Then our most inclusive domain 
of quantification includes wholly past and wholly future objects, 
where these are objects that occupy past times or future times, 
but not the present time. If so, then it’s false that for every x – 
quantifying over all temporal entities – x is a present thing. The 
Roman Empire existed, for instance, and it isn’t a present thing.
Since, according to the eternalist, the domain of temporal things 
includes the Roma Empire, if eternalism is true, (Prb”)2 isn’t. But 
eternalism isn’t manifestly false: I, at any rate, can’t just see that 
the domain of temporal things includes no wholly past or future 
entities. Since eternalism isn’t manifestly false, (Prb”) isn’t 
trivially true. (Crisp, 2004)
Crisp’s defence of presentism stems from the fact that 
presentism is formulated in the background of an eternalist 
conception of time. He holds that the reasons in support 
of eternalism are not impressive enough to have one 
jettison presentism. For him, in trying to express the claim 
that the Roman Empire existed in a presentist language, 
one may say: “For some x, x is the Roman Empire and x 
will not exist in to” (Ibid.). In this presentist language, to 
refers to the present times. Thus, that statement expresses 
the initial/original statement in a presentist language 
without having to assume that the Roman Empire is 
still in existence in the present moment. Crisp’s defence 
of presentism against the triviality challenge seems 
appealing but it only reflects the presentist’s tradition 
2 (Prb”) refers to the proposition “For every x, x is a present thing”.
of formulating the theory in order to meet challenges. I 
consider the triviality objection a genuine one that poses 
a serious threat to presentism. Crisp’s defence is a resort 
to a reformulation of the interpretation of the presentist’s 
expression so as to avoid the trivially true or trivially false 
claim. Even with this, Crisp’s reformulation does not 
address the challenge of triviality. 
From the point of view of what Ned Markosian calls 
the “tensed conception of semantics” which is the view 
that verbal tenses of ordinary language…must be taken 
as primitive and unanalysable and that have truth-value at 
times rather than having truth-value simpliciter (Carroll, 
2010, p.164), one may argue that Crisp’s re-interpretation 
does not take into consideration the importance of tenses 
or tensing for the truth-value of statements. If presentists 
are to adopt the form of interpretation suggested by Crisp, 
then they still have to address the challenge of trivial 
falsehood levelled against presentism for it will still be 
faced with explaining the correlation between things that 
have existed in the past that no longer exist and the claim 
only present things exist.
3 .  SOME FURTHER OBJECTIONS 
AGAINST PRESENTISM
One other challenge against presentism, though not a 
serious one, is the commonsensical view that presentism 
is averse to natural language. Natural languages in 
every human society have tensed terms of expressing 
past, present and future events and these terms form 
a meaningful means of communicating ideas among 
human beings. For instance, it makes a perfect and 
meaningful form of communication to say that “Jesus 
was born in Nazareth 2000 years ago”. It also makes 
sense, in ordinary natural language to say “Nigeria will 
host the FIFA World Cup in 2050”. Both statements 
express events in the past and that of the future which 
presentism denies as being real. Given the fact that there 
is a meaningful expression of past, present and future 
events in ordinary natural language shows that the burden 
of proof lies on presentism to counter-prove that these 
ways of expressing our thoughts about events (past and 
future) are meaningless. Presentism will have to overturn 
the foundation of natural language in this regard to make 
meaning of its  own position against the commonsensical 
usage of language and its expression.
A critic may argue that the commonsensical objection 
does not hold water since it is quite possible that the way 
natural language is used to express events in time is a 
perversion which has caused more confusion in trying 
to address the problem of time. One way to respond to 
this, I think, is to admit that the expression of thoughts 
about events and entities in the natural language may 
not be error-free but that the fact that such usage forms 
a meaningful means of expression and communication 
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shows that an otherwise suggestion will have more to 
prove. For in the presentist language, it is a bit difficult 
making sense of entities that are non-present, that 
is, entities that were in the past or that will be in the 
future. 
Another objection to be considered against presentism 
is that from the standpoint of truthmaking. Ben Caplan 
and David Sanson capture the thesis of truthmaking 
thus:
Some propositions – for example, the proposition that Saul 
Kripke is a philosopher – is true. Other propositions – for 
example, the proposition that Saul Kripke is a barber – are not. 
This is no accident. Reality has a say in which propositions are 
true and which are not. There are various ways of capturing this 
idea. One is to say that there cannot be a difference in truth – 
in which propositions are true – unless there is a difference in 
being: in what there is or what it’s like. In short, truth supervenes 
on being. This view is known as Truthmaking. (Caplan & 
Sanson, 2011)
In simple terms, the position of truthmaking is that 
for every true statement, there is something, in reality, 
that makes it true. Thus, the statement “Nigeria is the 
most populous black nation in the world” is made true 
by demographic facts about Nigeria. There is the reality 
about the state of Nigeria’s population which makes 
that statement true. The objection against presentism in 
this regard stems from the fact that there seems to be no 
truthmakers for presentist expression about past or future 
events. For example, the statement “There were dinosaurs” 
can be interpreted in a presentist language as “It has 
been the case that there are dinosaurs”. However, taken 
in this presentist form, there seems to be no truthmaker 
for this statement. In other words, there seems to be no 
fact in the present reality that supports the truth-value of 
that statement. One way presentists may tend to defend 
their position is to point to a shortcoming in the project of 
truthmaking and that is, to claim that truthmaking does not 
account for negative existential truths (Tallant, 2009). For 
example, how do we determine the truthmaker of negative 
statements like “There are no arctic penguins”? There 
seems to be no existing fact in reality that tends to make 
this statement true. This objection may raise a challenge 
for the idea of truthmaking, it however does not address 
the objection of truthmaking against presentism because 
it is not in all cases that true statements are expressed in 
negative terms.
CONCLUSION
As said earlier, presentism is the view that only present 
things exist (constitute reality). The position of this 
paper is that presentism is faced with a dilemma which 
portrays it as an inadequate theory in addressing the 
problem of time. To start with, one of the ordering of 
time includes the characteristics of past, present and 
the future. Each of these characteristics disappears into 
the other, for example, it is the future that becomes 
the present and it is the present that slips into the past. 
There seems to be a causal link between events in this 
regard. But presentism denies the past and the future. 
For presentism, only the present constitute reality. This 
raises the question on the temporality of the present 
which presentism claims to constitute reality and also 
a further question on how it comes to be. Is the present 
permanently present or it is dynamic. One great attribute 
of time is change (dynamism). This attribute calls to 
question the nature of the present which forms the basis 
of reality in presentism. 
Time changes and if one agrees with presentism that 
the present constitutes the reality, given the factor of 
change, how does one account for the temporality of that 
which is in the present. For example, if one has to write 
an exam in a metaphysics course from 9:00 am to 12:00 
noon, how does one account for every passing moment 
within those hours of the exam even when the exam is 
still ongoing. In other words, whatever one has done 
around 9:51 am in the exam hall has been in the past at 
11:15 am when the exam is still ongoing. The claim here 
is that presentism is beset with the problem of what the 
nature of the present itself is. If the presentist account is 
that the present is that which exists “now”, then it is faced 
with a further problem of what “now” represents. If the 
presentist, in turn, says “now” represents that which is 
simultaneous with being talking or doing or engaging in 
an activity, then there is the problem that every action is 
fraught with passing moments which makes it difficult 
to pinpoint the exact point in the activity that “now” or 
“present” is simultaneous with. 
Having denied time of the characteristics of past and 
future and given the problem attached to explain the 
nature of the present which implies that the foundation 
of presentism is faulty, then there is a subtle implication 
that presentism admits of the unreality of time. This 
implication, I think, is opposed to the position of 
presentism but it is a challenge that stares presentism in 
the face.
On the other hand, to make sense of its idea of the 
present and given causal connections between events 
in the past and the present or events in the present 
and future, presentism may want to admit to the 
reality of the past and the future. This, I think, would 
also be contradictory to the thesis of presentism. In 
another vein, a presentist may argue that the past and 
future do not constitute reality but events in them are 
acknowledged using presentist language. This argument 
seems confusing and it constitutes the foundation of the 
challenges that have been raised against the theory of 
presentism. I do not, however, claim that this dilemma 
is exhaustive of what presentism can be subjected to 
(to avoid the fallacy of false dilemma) but that they are 
arguments to show the shortcomings of the theory of 
57 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Adeyanju Olanshile Muideen (2017). 
Canadian Social Science, 13(7), 53-57
presentism as inadequate in addressing the problem of 
time. 
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